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The old theory of the kinked demand curve (Hall and Hitch, 1939;
and Sweezy, 1939) was the ﬁrst attempt to formalise the long-standing
belief that tacit collusion and price rigidity are linked. It assumes that
there is a prevailing focal price and that rivals will match a ﬁrm's price
decrease but they will not match a price increase. This rivalry implies
that each ﬁrm's demand curve has a kink at the focal price, and it
follows from the resultant discontinuity inmarginal revenue curve that
prices remain constant at the focal level for a range of marginal costs.
Although the rivalry of the kinked demand curve has an intuitive appeal
and some anecdotal support, this theory has been heavily criticised (for
example see Tirole, 1988, p.243-245).
Contemporary models of dynamic oligopolistic interaction differ in
two respectswith the kinkeddemand curve. First, they aremodelled as an
explicit dynamic game using the theory of repeated games, where
collusive prices are sustainable when the short-term gain from any
deviation is outweighed by the long-term loss from a credible retaliation.
Second, ﬁrms usually more than match lower deviation prices, because
the most commonly analysed retaliations are “Nash reversion” (see
Friedman, 1971) and “optimal punishment strategies” (see Abreu, 1986,
1988). Using such models, there is a theoretical literature that analyses
the effect of temporary changes inmarket conditions on the best collusive
prices that achieve the highest levels of proﬁt possible (for example see
Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991; Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986).1 Achanges in demand, many of
se.feature of this literature is that, barring the special circumstances when
incentives are perfectly aligned, the best collusive prices are not rigid over
time. This is at oddswith the results of the kinked demand curve andwith
the belief that tacit collusion and price rigidity are linked.
In this paper, we analyse the rivalry of the kinked demand curve in
an inﬁnitely repeated game and show that, in contrast to the previous
collusion literature, the best collusive prices can be rigid over time
despite small industry-wide changes in unit costs. This provides game
theoretic support for the results of the kinked demand curve. We
derive this result by extending Lu and Wright (2010) who analyse an
inﬁnitely repeated game where, similar to the kinked demand curve,
ﬁrms match lower deviation prices (provided they are above the one-
shot Nash equilibrium price) but do not match higher deviation prices.
They show that collusive prices are sustainable under such “price-
matching punishments”when products are symmetrically differentiated
and when market conditions do not vary over time. We extend their
model so that unit costs alternate stochastically between high and low
states, and analyse the characteristics of the best collusive subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are rigid over time.
The intuition behind price rigidity in our model is that when unit
costs are temporarily high today and they are permanently low in the
future, there is an incentive to deviate today from any collusive price
above the collusive price that prevails in the future. The reason is that
when a ﬁrm deviates to that future price today, there is no long-term
loss to offset the deviation gain, because the punishment is just to
match the deviation price, which still results in the collusive price
being set in the future. An implication of this is that the best collusive
prices are rigid when the two cost levels are sufﬁciently close, such
that the one-shot Nash equilibrium price of the high-cost state is not
2 Levenstein (1997) and Genesove and Mullin (2001) also ﬁnd that some cartel price
wars consisted of mild punishments and price matching, respectively, but due to
infrequent price observations it is not possible to determine the extent to which prices
vary over time.
3 Bhaskar (1988) and Kalai and Satterthwaite (1994) show that price rigidity does
not occur in a one-shot game when lower prices can be matched immediately before
proﬁts are realised. In an inﬁnitely repeated game where a duopoly alternates between
committing to price for two periods, Maskin and Tirole (1988) show that price rigidity
can occur in a Markov perfect equilibrium when costs fall permanently, because ﬁrms
attempt to avoid a price war. However, this is because rivals more than match lower
prices. In another related inﬁnitely repeated game, Slade (1989) captures the three
stylised facts discussed above when an unexpected change in demand is anticipated to
be permanent, but stable prices only occur in her model when the new equilibrium is
reached.
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future, price matching such a deviation does reduce the proﬁts of
future high-cost states, but this long-term loss must outweigh the
initial gain for procyclical prices to be sustainable. Given this loss is
small and the gain is large when the two cost levels are close, the best
collusive prices are rigid over time when the difference between the
two cost levels is below some critical threshold. We show that this
critical threshold falls as high-cost states are likely to persist for
longer into the future, and it equals zero when the high-cost state is
expected to last permanently.
In contrast to the kinked demand curve, our model generates
predictions regarding the level of the best rigid price and the effects of
the other parameters of the model on it. This price uniquely achieves
the highest level of proﬁt possible, given that the price does not vary
over time. It deﬁnes the best collusive price in both cost stateswhen the
difference between the two cost levels is below the critical threshold,
and it is always between the one-shot Nash equilibrium price of the
high-cost state and the monopoly price of the low-cost state for such
conditions. The best rigid price is determined by the incentives to collude
in low-cost states, and it monotonically increases with the level of high
costs at a rate that is less than one-to-one. An implication of these features
is that when the best collusive prices are rigid over time, the resultant
per-period collusive proﬁts of low-cost states are strictly increasing in the
level of high costs, but such proﬁts of high-cost states are strictly
decreasing in the level of high costs. In contrast, the corresponding
present discounted values of collusive proﬁts are strictly decreasing in the
level of high costs, whether the initial period has high or low costs.
Our model also generates predictions regarding the relationship
between price rigidity and the number of ﬁrms in the market, which
has been investigated by several empirical studies (for example see
Carlton, 1986, 1989). This relationship ultimately depends upon the
degree of product differentiation. Based on an example where demand
is derived from the constant elasticity of substitution version of Spence–
Dixit–Stiglitz preferences (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Spence, 1976), we
show that the best collusive prices are rigid for the largest difference
between the two cost levels when products are differentiated by an
intermediate degree. This is because price-matching punishments do
not support collusive priceswhen products are homogeneous, and since
ﬁrms can set the monopoly prices when they have no close rivals.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the best collusive prices are rigid for a larger
difference between the two cost levels in a concentrated market, with
few ﬁrms, than in a less concentrated market, with a greater number of
ﬁrms, when the degree of product differentiation is sufﬁciently low.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the
related literature and provides anecdotal support for a link between
price matching and price rigidity. Section 3 outlines the assumptions on
demand and costs, and it formally deﬁnes the price-matching punish-
ment strategy. In Section 4,weﬁrstﬁnd the conditions forwhich the best
collusive prices are rigid over time. We then analyse the relationship
between such price rigidity and the expected duration of a sequence of
high-cost states, and after that we investigate the effects of such price
rigidity and ﬂuctuating costs on the best collusive proﬁts. Section 5
places more structure on demand to investigate the effects of both the
degree of product differentiation and the number of ﬁrms in the market
on such price rigidity, and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to
Appendix A.
2. Related literature and evidence
In this paper, we propose that the expectation that lower deviation
prices will bematched can lead to price rigidity during collusive phases,
and there is some anecdotal support for a link between the two. Slade
(1987, 1992) analysed a price war between gasoline retailers during
1983 in Vancouver (see also Slade, 1990). She found that there was “a
high degree of (lagged) pricematching during thewar” and that “prices
before and after the war were uniform across ﬁrms and stable overtime” (1992, p.264). In fact, “after the price war came to an end, prices
were stable for nearly a year” (1987, p.515). Slade (1989, p.295) also
argues that other Canadian markets (including nickel, cigarette, as well
as gasoline) had three stylised facts: “First, price is the choice variable
and it can be observed by all. Second, price wars are occasional events
and are separated by periods of stable prices. Third, during awar there is
considerable matching of prices”. Similarly, Kalai and Satterthwaite
(1994) state that between 1900 and 1958 small ﬁrms in the US steel
industry believed that the largest producer would match their prices if
they undercut it, and observed that “BeforeWorldWar II certain classes
of steel products showed remarkable price rigidity” (p.31).2
The anecdotal evidence above suggests that, in at least some
situations, price matching is a relevant form of ﬁrm behaviour, and
this is re-emphasised by Slade's (1987) empirical evidence that ﬁnds
some support for strategies, similar to price matching, where “small
deviations lead to small punishments” overNash reversion (p.499). This
contrasts with the informal reasoning that argues that since collusion is
easier to sustain under harsher punishments, then colluding ﬁrms
would employ the harshest credible punishment. The evidence above
also suggests that our price rigidity result may be of some empirical
relevance for such situations where price matching is prevalent. This
differs to previous attempts to model the rivalry of the kinked demand
curve in dynamic settings, because they do not ﬁnd a link between price
matching and price rigidity.3
Our model also contrasts with the literature that analyses
collusion when market conditions vary over time. Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986) show that under Nash reversion the deviation gains
are greatest in a temporary boom but the long-term losses are
constant when future market conditions are independent of current
conditions. This implies that any price that is just sustainable in a
low-cost boom is easier to sustain in a high-cost bust, so the best
collusive prices are procyclical. For similar reasons, the incentive to
deviate from a rigid price is greatest in a period of low costs under
price-matching punishments, when future ﬂuctuations in costs are
independent of or positively correlated with the current level. However,
procyclical collusive prices may not be sustainable, because there is a
discontinuity in the incentives to collude at the rigid price in high-cost
states. This is because price matching reduces only the price set in future
high-cost states when a ﬁrm deviates in a period of high costs by
reducing its price to the low-cost price that prevails in low-cost periods.
Therefore, such a deviation from a price above yet very close to the low-
cost price can generate amuch smaller long-term loss than an otherwise
identical deviation from the low-cost price, where price matching
reduces the prices set in all future periods. Yet, the deviation gains are
effectively the same for such deviations. As a result, a deviation in a
period of high costs from a price only slightly above the low-cost price
can be proﬁtable, even though a deviation from the low-cost pricewill be
strictly unproﬁtable.
Finally, this paper is also related to Athey et al. (2004) who develop
an alternative model of collusive price rigidity, where prices are publicly
observable but ﬁrms experience private shocks to their unit costs in each
period. They show that the best collusive prices under Nash reversion
may be rigid over time because, although demand is not allocated to the
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detecting deviations easily.4 Their model is similar to Green and Porter
(1984) since, due to some information asymmetry, price wars can occur
on the equilibrium path when ﬁrms receive a bad signal. In contrast,
price wars do not occur on the equilibrium path in our model, because
there is symmetric information. Instead, the successfulness of collusion is
affected bymarket conditions in a similarway as Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986). Our model adds to our understanding of price rigidity because it
is the ﬁrst to consider the relationship between price rigidity and the
degree of product differentiation, and it can be tested empirically since it
does not rely on parameters that are likely to be unobservable to an
econometrician.
3. The model
3.1. Basic assumptions
Consider a market where a ﬁxed number of n≥2 ﬁrms each
produce a single differentiated product and compete in observable
prices over an inﬁnite number of periods. In any period t, ﬁrms have
constant unit costs, ct≥0, face no ﬁxed costs, and have a common
discount factor, δ∈(0, 1). They simultaneously choose price in each
period and the demand of ﬁrm i=1, …, n in period t is qi(pit, p− it, n)
where pit is its own price and p− it is the vector of its rivals' prices.
Demand is symmetric, strictly decreasing in pit and limpit→∞qi(pit, p− it,
n)=0. Sinceﬁrms are symmetric, at equal prices pit=pt for all i, qi(pt, pt,
n)=q(pt)/n where q(pt) is independent of n. For every price vector
pt=(pit,p− it) where qi(pit,p− it,n)>0 for all i, demand is twice
continuously differentiable and from Vives (2001, p.148-152) we
assume it has the following standard properties:
Assumption 1.
∂qi
∂pit

 >∑j≠ i ∂qi∂pjt > 0
Assumption 2.
∂2qi
∂pit∂pjt
≥ 0 ∀ j≠ i
Assumption 3.
∂2qi
∂p2it
þ∑j≠ i
∂2qi
∂pit∂pjt
b 0:
These assumptions imply that products are imperfect substitutes,
demand exhibits increasing differences in (pit, pjt) and the own effect
of a price change dominates the cross effect both in terms of the level
and slope of demand.
Firm i's per-period proﬁt in period t is πit(pit, p− it; ct, n)=(pit−ct)
qi(pit, p− it, n), where at equal prices pit=pt for all i write πit(pt, pt; ct,
n)=πt(pt; ct, n). Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that prices are strategic
complements:
∂2πit
∂pit∂pjt
> 0 ∀ j≠ i ∀ t: ð1Þ4 In a similar model, Hanazono and Yang (2007) show that price rigidity can also
occur with unobservable demand ﬂuctuations.Since unit costs are constant in any period, Assumptions 1 and 3
are sufﬁcient to ensure the best reply mapping is a contraction (see
Vives, 2001, p.150):
∂2πit
∂p2it
þ ∑
j≠ i
∂2πit
∂pit∂pjt
b 0 ∀ t: ð2Þ
This guarantees the existence of a unique one-shot Nash equilibrium
price in pure strategies, denoted pN(ct, n). It follows from (1) and (2)
that each ﬁrm's per-period proﬁt is strictly concave in its own price
(i.e. ∂2πit/∂pit2b0), which implies that if rivals charge a price above
pN(ct, n), then a ﬁrm can strictly increase its per-period proﬁt by
unilaterally lowering its price towards the one-shot Nash equilib-
rium price (i.e. ∂πit=∂pitb0 ∀ pjt > pNðct ;nÞ; j≠i). Assumption 1
guarantees that pN(ct, n) is strictly increasing in ct and to ensure
that pN(ct, n) is strictly decreasing in n, we assume the following
sufﬁcient condition:
Assumption 4.
∂2qi
∂pit∂n
b 0:
Finally, to ensure that the monopoly price, pm(ct), is unique with
pm(ct)>pN(ct, n) we assume:
Assumption 5.
d2πt
dp2t
¼ ∂
2πit
∂p2it
þ 2∑j≠ i
∂2πit
∂pit∂pjt
þ ∂
2πit
∂p2jt
b 0 ∀ t:
An implication of Assumption 5 is that if all ﬁrms set the same
price below the monopoly price, then they would strictly increase
their per-period proﬁts if all set a higher price (i.e. dπt/dpt>0∀pN(ct,
n)≤ptbpm(ct)). Assumption 1 ensures that pm(ct) is strictly increasing
in ct, while the symmetry assumptions on demand and costs guarantee
that pm(ct) is independent of n.
3.2. Cost ﬂuctuations
In any period, unit costs can be low or high such that ct=0 or
ct=c>0. To simplify notation, write pN(0,n)=pN(n), pm(0)=pm and
πit(pit, p− it; 0, n)=πit(pit, p− it; n). The current level is common
knowledge before ﬁrms set prices, and expectations of future levels of
ct for all t follow a Markov process such that:
λ≡ Prðct ¼ c ct−1 ¼ 0j Þ∈ 0;1ð Þ
θ ≡ Prðct ¼ 0 ct−1 ¼ cj Þ∈ 0;1ð Þ
μ ≡ Pr c0 ¼ cð Þ∈ 0;1½ 
Thus, λ is the transition probability associated with moving from a
low-cost state to one of high costs, and θ is the probability that
correspondswith a transition fromhigh costs to low costs. The parameter
μ describes how the system begins.
This process implies that the probability that costs will be high in
the next period is λ if they are currently low, otherwise it is 1−θ.
Thus, future costs are independent of the current level if 1−θ−λ=0,
and this simple case provides a benchmark for our analysis. In many
industries it is natural to expect that future costs will be positively
correlated with the current level. Consequently, we also allow for the
case where 1−θ−λ>0, which implies that it is more likely that the
current cost level will continue into the next period than change.
Following the terminology of Bagwell and Staiger (1997), we refer to
the former as zero correlation (1−θ−λ=0) and the latter as positive
correlation (1−θ−λ>0).
price
time
pτ (c)
pτ (0)
pN (c,n)
p
τ τ
N (n)
+ 1 τ + 2 τ + 3 τ + 4 τ + 5 τ + 6
Fig. 1. Pricing after a one-stage deviation to X, Y and Z in period τ.
5 An alternative strategy is one where downward deviations from pt(c) to X are
matched in all future periods, other things equal. Since this alternative and (3) are
equivalent for rigid prices, the range of rigid prices sustainable and the characteristics
of the best rigid price are the same. We focus on (3) because there is an asymmetry in
this alternative strategy, since a ﬁrm is unable to increase the low-cost price by raising
its price from pt(0) to X in a period of low costs, but it is able to by lowering its price
from pt(c) to X in a period of high costs. An implication of this is that the parameter
space where the best collusive prices are rigid under (3) is a strict subset of that under
this alternative strategy, so it is robust to both strategies.
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Due to the Markov process that determines future cost levels,
collusive proﬁts are the same in any high-cost state regardless of the
speciﬁc date, other things equal, and likewise for any low-cost state.
Thus, the best collusive prices emerge as a pair, and we wish to ﬁnd
the conditions for which these are equal. Analysing the best collusive
prices is consistentwith theprominent papers in the collusion literature
(for example see Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991; Rotemberg and
Saloner, 1986), and it is also consistent with the kinked demand curve
since the most proﬁtable equilibrium is often argued to be the most
logical (see Tirole, 1988, p.244).
Let the collusive prices of high- and low-cost states be p(c) and
p(0), respectively, and denote ΩH(p(c),p(0)) as a ﬁrm's expected
discounted proﬁt in period t and thereafter, if period t is a high-cost
state. Similarly, denote ΩL(p(0), p(c)) as a ﬁrm's expected discounted
proﬁt in period t and thereafter, if period t is a low-cost state. Suppressing
notation slightly, it is possible to write such proﬁts as:
ΩH ¼ π p cð Þ; c;nð Þ þ δθΩL þ δ 1−θð ÞΩH
ΩL ¼ π p 0ð Þ;nð Þ þ δλΩH þ δ 1−λð ÞΩL:
Solving for ΩH and ΩL gives:
ΩH p cð Þ; p 0ð Þð Þ ¼ π p cð Þ; c;nð Þ þ
δ
1−δ
θ
ω
π p 0ð Þ;nð Þ þ 1− θ
ω
 
π p cð Þ; c;nð Þ
 
ΩL p 0ð Þ; p cð Þð Þ ¼ π p 0ð Þ;nð Þ þ
δ
1−δ
λ
ω
π p cð Þ; c;nð Þ þ 1− λ
ω
 
π p 0ð Þ;nð Þ
 
;
whereω≡1−δ(1−θ−λ)>0, 0 b θω b 1 and0 b λω b 1. The ﬁrst terms on
the right hand-side of the above equations represent the proﬁts from the
initial periods, and the second terms represent the discounted proﬁts
from all future periods, conditional on expectations of future cost levels.
3.4. Punishment strategy
Drawing on the insights of Lu and Wright (2010), we assume that
ﬁrm i's price-matching punishment strategy proﬁle for all t is of the
form:
pi0 ¼ p0 c0ð Þ ¼ p c0ð Þ
pit ¼ pt ctð Þ ¼
p ctð Þ if pjτ ¼ pτ cτð Þ ∀ j ∀ τ∈ 0;…; t−1f g
max pN ct ; nð Þ;min pdt ; p ctð Þ
n on o
otherwise
(
ð3Þ
where ptd is a vector of the history of deviation prices at period t (i.e. it
includes all prices where pjτ≠pτ(cτ)∀ j∀τ∈ {0,…,t−1}). This
strategy calls for each ﬁrm to set the initial collusive prices until a
deviation. Following a deviation, the lowest ever deviation price is
matched in periods where it is above the one-shot Nash equilibrium
price and it is below the initial collusive price of that period. The one-
shot Nash equilibrium price is set in any period when the lowest ever
deviation price is below the one-shot Nash equilibrium price. Similarly,
the initial collusive price is set in any period when the lowest ever
deviation price is above this collusive price. This is repeated for future
deviations.
Fig. 1 illustrates the implications for pricing for various one-stage
deviations in period τ (i.e. where a ﬁrm deviates for one period, then
conforms to (3) thereafter). Understanding such deviations are impor-
tant for our purposes, because we use the one-stage deviation principle
(see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.108-110) to solve for subgame
perfect Nash equilibria. This principle states that a strategy proﬁle
induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame, if there is no history that
leads to a subgame in which a deviant will choose an action that differs
to the one prescribed by the strategy, then conform to the strategy
thereafter (assuming the deviant believes others will also conform to
the strategy). Thus, to prove subgame perfection, it sufﬁces to show thata one stage-deviation is not proﬁtable in the initial collusive subgames
and nor are such deviations in every possible punishment subgame.We
say that collusive prices are supportable if the strategy proﬁle in Eq. (3)
is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for all i=1,…, n.
The collusive prices are initially procyclical in Fig. 1, because ﬁrms
set pτ(c) and pτ(0) in high- and low-cost states, respectively. If a ﬁrm
deviated to Y in period τ, then Y is matched thereafter. If it deviated to
Z, however, then Z is matched in future low-cost states, otherwise
pN(c, n) is set. Departing slightly from the kinked demand curve but
consistent with Lu and Wright (2010), ﬁrms do not match prices
below pN(ct, n) in period t because doing so seems unreasonable. This
assumption is not crucial in determining the range of rigid prices for
which collusion is sustainable or the parameter space where the best
collusive prices are rigid. This is because a deviation to Z is always less
proﬁtable than a deviation to Y in a period of low costs when the best
collusive prices are rigid, and a deviation to Z would never occur in a
period of high costs, even for prices that are not supportable. This
assumption ensures that (3) deﬁnes a Nash equilibrium in punishment
subgames for histories where the lowest ever deviation price is below
pN(ct, n) in period t, and that it is possible to check that (3) induces a
Nash equilibrium in punishment subgames that start with a period of
low costs for histories where the lowest deviation price is between
pN(n) and pN(c, n).
The strategy proﬁle (3) also has a similar feature for one-stage
deviations to prices above the lowest initial collusive price, because if
a ﬁrm deviated to X, then X is matched only in periods when the initial
collusive price is above X, otherwise pτ(0) is set. Fig. 1 illustrates the
case for procyclical prices, but it equally applies to the case of
countercyclical prices (where pτ(c) is set in low-cost states and pτ(0)
in high-cost states). This resembles the rivalry of the kinked demand
curve, where ﬁrms do not match price increases. This is because for
deviations where a ﬁrm raises its price from pτ(0) to a price above
pτ(0), the deviation is nevermatched in future low-cost states and it is
also notmatched in future high-cost stateswhen there is price rigidity.
A slight difference is that X is not matched in future low-cost states, if
prices are procyclical and a ﬁrm lowered its price from pτ(c) to X in
period τ. However, the rationale for the strategy is the same: each ﬁrm
expects to lose sales, if it set X in periods when its rivals are expected
to set pτ(0).5
6 This is because under optimal punishments the long-term loss is larger when the
future collusive proﬁts are greater, since proﬁts are zero in the punishment phase.
Consequently, the long-term loss would be largest when a ﬁrm deviates in a period of
low costs under positive correlation.
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4.1. A theory of price rigidity
We wish to ﬁnd the conditions for which the best collusive prices
are rigid. Prices are procyclical when the level of high costs is so large
that pN(c, n)>pm, so we initially consider the case where c∈ 0; cð  such
that pN c;nð Þ ¼ pm. Similarly, price rigidity can only occur when (3)
deﬁnes a Nash equilibrium in subgames where ﬁrms should set p,
such that pN(n)≤p≤pN(c, n), in low-cost states and pN(c, n) in high-
cost states. Otherwise, there would be some punishment subgames
where ﬁrms will not conform to (3) for histories when the lowest
ever deviation price is between pN(n) and pN(c, n). Clearly a ﬁrm will
not deviate from pN(c, n) in a period of high costs, so consider ﬁrm i's
incentive to deviate from any such p in a period of low costs. Firm i's
present discounted value of deviation proﬁts if it sets the same or a
lower price pi∈ [pN(n), p] in the initial period and then conforms to
(3) thereafter is:
ΩziL pi;p;p
N c;nð Þ
 
≡ πi pi;p;nð Þ
þ δ
1−δ
λ
ω
π pN c;nð Þ; c;n
 
þ 1− λ
ω
 
π pi;nð Þ
 
:
ð4Þ
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of Eq. (4) is the proﬁt from
the initial period. The second term is the expected discounted proﬁts
from future periods, given pi will be matched in future low-cost states
but pN(c, n) is set in future high-cost states. It follows from this that
ﬁrm i will not deviate from p by setting pi if ΩL(p, pN(c, n))≥ΩiLz (pi, p,
pN(c, n)) for all pi∈ [pN(n), p].
Lemma 1. For every n≥2, δ∈(0, 1) and 1−θ−λ≥0, there exists a
unique c^ ∈ 0; cð Þ such that the one-shot Nash equilibrium price of
the high-cost state, pN(c,n), and p, where pN(n)bp≤pN(c,n), are
supportable in high- and low-cost states, respectively, if and only if
c∈ 0; c^ð .
When the difference between the two cost levels is sufﬁciently
small, pN(c, n) is close enough to pN(n) such that a ﬁrmwill not deviate
from pN(c, n) in a collusive subgame that starts with a period of low
costs. This is because the deviation gain from setting p between pN(n)
and pN(c, n) is outweighed by the long-term loss from matching p in
future periods of low costs. In punishment subgames that start with a
period of low costs, the condition for a ﬁrm to want to deviate from p is
the same as the condition to deviate from pN(c, n), except that the price
is lower. Since the standard properties of the underlying competition
game imply that it is less proﬁtable to deviate froma price close to pN(n)
than a higher price, a ﬁrm will not deviate in any such punishment
subgame, if it will not deviate from pN(c, n) in the collusive subgame.
Consequently, the punishment is credible and harsh enough to support
pN(c, n) in both cost states when the difference between the two cost
levels is sufﬁciently small.
In the next subsection, we limit our attention to equilibria with the
sameprice pc>pN(c, n) in both cost states. This allows us to characterise
the best rigid price that achieves the highest level of proﬁt possible,
given that the price does not vary over time. In the subsection after, we
ﬁnd the conditions for which ﬁrms can do no better than set the best
rigid price in both cost states.
4.1.1. Best rigid price
Under the conditions of Lemma 1, a rigid price pc is only
supportable when ﬁrms will not deviate from any rigid price p, such
that pN(c, n)≤p≤pc, in both high- and low-cost periods. Otherwise
there is at least one collusive/punishment subgame where a ﬁrm
will not conform to (3). Depending upon whether the cost state is
high or low in the initial period, ﬁrm i's present discounted values ofdeviation proﬁts if it sets the same or lower price p∈ [pN(c, n), pc] in
the initial period and then conforms to (3) thereafter are:
ΩyiH p;p
c	 
 ≡ πi p; pc; c;n	 
þ δ1−δ θω π p;nð Þ þ 1− θω
 
π p; c;nð Þ
 
ð5Þ
ΩyiL p;p
c	 
≡ πi p;pc;n	 
þ δ1−δ λωπ p; c;nð Þ þ 1− λω
 
π p;nð Þ
 
; ð6Þ
respectively. The ﬁrst terms on the right-hand side of Eqs. (5) and (6)
are the proﬁts from the initial periods. This proﬁt is lower in Eq. (5)
than Eq. (6), because per-period proﬁts are strictly decreasing in ct.
The second terms are the expected discounted proﬁts from future
periods, given p will be matched forever. When there is positive
correlation, the second term is lower in Eq. (5) than Eq. (6), but they
are equal under zero correlation.
The above implies that if ΩH(pc, pc)≥ΩiHy (p, pc) for all p∈ [pN(c, n),
pc], then ﬁrm i will not deviate from pc by setting any such p in high-
cost states. Likewise, it will not deviate from pc by setting any such p
in low-cost states if ΩL(pc, pc)≥ΩiLy(p, pc) for all p∈ [pN(c, n), pc]. We
can write the slack in these constraints as:
ξyiH p; p
c	 
≡− πi p; pc; c;n	 
−π pc; c;n	 
 
þ δ
1−δ
θ
ω
π pc;n
	 

−π p;nð Þ þ 1− θ
ω
 
π pc; c;n
	 

−π p; c;nð Þ  
ξyiL p;p
c	 
≡− πi p; pc;n	 
−π pc;n	 
 
þ δ
1−δ
λ
ω
π pc; c;n
	 

−π p; c;nð Þ þ 1− λ
ω
 
π pc;n
	 

−π p;nð Þ  ;
respectively. Consider the difference between the two. After some
rearranging and cancellation, we ﬁnd:
ξyiH p;p
c	 
−ξyiL p;pc	 
 ¼ c qi p; pc;n	 
−1nq pc
	 
 þ δ
ω
1−θ−λð Þ c
n
q pð Þ−q pc	 
 :
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of the above is the difference
between the deviation gains, and the second term is the difference
between the long-term losses due to the price-matching punishment.
It follows from the assumptions on demand and 1−θ−λ≥0 that
ξiHy (p, pc)>ξiLy (p, pc) for any p∈ [pN(c, n), pc), so ﬁrm i's incentive to
deviate is greatest in a period of low costs under zero and positive
correlation. This is because the deviation gain is largest and the long-
term loss is smallest when a ﬁrm deviates in a period of low costs. The
latter effect, unlike the former, is distinct from a similar model where
ﬁrms follow optimal punishments. 6 The reason for it in our model is
that a matched price causes a smaller loss in per-period proﬁts when
unit costs are lower, so the long-term loss is smaller when more low-
cost states are expected in the future, which is the case in a period of
low costs under positive correlation. Thus, if ξiLy (p,pc)≥0 for all
p∈ [pN(c, n), pc], then ﬁrm i will not deviate from pc by setting any
such p in low- and high-cost states.
Lemma 2. For every n≥2, δ∈(0, 1) and 1−θ−λ≥0, there exists a
unique best rigid price, pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ), that is supportable in both
cost states if and only if c∈ 0; c^ð , where pN(c, n)bpLy(c,n,δ,λ,θ)bpm(c).
Any rigid price pc such that pN(c,n)≤pc≤pLy(c,n,δ,λ,θ) is also
supportable.
When the difference between the two cost levels is sufﬁciently
small, there exists some rigid price pc that is above yet close enough
to pN(c, n), such that a ﬁrm will not deviate from pc in a collusive
subgame that starts with a period of low costs. This is because the
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cost state is outweighed by the long-term loss from matching p in all
future periods.7 In punishment subgames that start with a period of
low costs, the condition for a ﬁrm to want to deviate from p is the same
as the condition to deviate from pc, except the price is lower. Since the
standard properties of the underlying competition game imply that it is
less proﬁtable to deviate from a price close to pN(c, n) than a higher
price, a ﬁrmwill not deviate in any such punishment subgame, if it will
not deviate from pc in the collusive subgame. Furthermore, this and the
analysis above implies that a ﬁrm will also not deviate from pc or from
any rigid price between pN(c, n) and pc in subgames that start with a
period of high costs. Consequently, the punishment is credible and
harsh enough to support pc in both cost states, when pc is sufﬁciently
close to pN(c, n) and when the difference between the two cost levels is
sufﬁciently small.
The best rigid price has the unique property that a small deviation
from it in a period of low costs that is matched in all future periods
balances the ﬁrst-order increase in the deviation proﬁt with the ﬁrst-
order decrease in future proﬁts (i.e. the argument maximising (6) is
pc). This implies that the (unconstrained) optimal ‘deviation’ price
from the best rigid price in a period of low costs is equal to the best
rigid price. At any rigid price above this level, there is an incentive
to deviate in a period of low costs (i.e. for any pc>pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ), then
ξiLy(p, pc)b0 for some pbpc). Since it is less proﬁtable to deviate in a
period of high costs than one of low costs, the (constrained) optimal
‘deviation’ price from the best rigid price in a period of high costs also
equals the best rigid price.8 The best rigid price is equivalent to the
best collusive price analysed by Lu and Wright (2010) as c→0, and it
is strictly increasing in the level of high costs. The reason is that a
given rigid price is easier to support in a period of low costs when the
high-cost level is closer to c^ than when it is close to zero, because the
long-term loss from a small deviation increases with c. In contrast to
Lu and Wright (2010), the monopoly price of the low-cost state may
be supportable. This is because a small deviation from pm in a period
of low costs can balance the ﬁrst-order increase in the deviation proﬁt
with the ﬁrst-order decrease in future proﬁts of high-cost states. 9
4.1.2. Best collusive prices and price rigidity
The best collusive prices are rigid if a ﬁrm will deviate from any
procyclical or countercyclical prices that would be more proﬁtable
than setting the best rigid price in both cost states. To see that such
countercyclical prices are not supportable, suppose that the initial
collusive prices are p(0) and p(c) for low- and high-cost states,
respectively, where p(0) is above p(c). A necessary (but not sufﬁcient)
condition for such prices to be more proﬁtable than setting the best
rigid price in both cost states is that p(0) must be strictly greater than
the best rigid price. Consider ﬁrm i's incentive to deviate in a period of
low costs. Firm i's present discounted value of deviation proﬁts if it sets
the same or a lower price p∈ [p(c), p(0)] in the initial period, then
conforms to (3) thereafter is:
ΩxiL p; p 0ð Þ;p cð Þð Þ ≡ πi p; p 0ð Þ;nð Þ þ
δ
1−δ
λ
ω
π p cð Þ; c;nð Þ þ 1− λ
ω
 
π p;nð Þ
 
:7 Furthermore, it is never proﬁtable to deviate from a rigid price above pN(c, n) to a
price below pN(c, n) in a period of low-costs for all c∈ 0; c^ð .
8 A ﬁrm would want to deviate from the best rigid price to a higher price in a period
of high costs, if ﬁrms matched such a deviation price in all future periods. However,
this would not be a credible strategy even if such deviations were matched, because a
ﬁrmwould want to deviate from such a price in punishment subgames that start with a
period of low costs when the price should be matched.
9 There is no ﬁrst-order decrease in the proﬁts of future low-cost states, because
such proﬁts are ﬂat at pm. It is this feature that determines that pm is not supportable by
price-matching punishments, when all future periods are expected to have low costs.Thus, a ﬁrm will not deviate from p(0) by setting p if ΩL(p(0),
p(c))≥ΩiLx (p, p(0), p(c)) for all p∈ [p(c), p(0)], where the slack in
this constraint is:
ξxiL p; p 0ð Þð Þ ≡− πi p; p 0ð Þ;nð Þ−π p 0ð Þ;nð Þ½  þ
δ
1−δ 1−
λ
ω
 
π p 0ð Þ;nð Þ−π p;nð Þ½ Þ:
Notice that ξiLx (p,p(0)) does not depend on p(c), because the
punishment results in ﬁrms still setting p(c) in high-cost states, and
as a consequence it is the same as ξiLy(p, p(0)), except that there is no
long-term loss in proﬁts of future high-cost states. This implies that
since it is proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to deviate from a rigid price above the
best rigid price in a period of low costs, then an otherwise identical
deviation is evenmore proﬁtable when prices are countercyclical (i.e. for
any p(0)>pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ), ξiLx(p, p(0))bξiLy(p, p(0))b0 for some pbp(0)).
Therefore, the best collusive prices cannot be countercyclical.
Now consider whether the best collusive prices can be procyclical,
where p(c) is above p(0). First consider how this affects the best collusive
price of the low-cost state, denoted p*(0)∈[pN(c, n), pm]. Notice thatﬁrm
i's present discounted value of deviation proﬁts is equivalent to (6), if it
deviates from p(0) to some p∈[pN(c, n), p(0)] in a period of low costs.
Thus, such a deviation is not proﬁtable ifΩL(p(0), p(c))≥ΩiLy(p, p(0)) for
all p∈ [pN(c, n), p(0)]. SinceΩL(p(0), p(c)) increaseswith p(c) butΩiLy(p,
p(0)) is independent of p(c), then there is still no incentive to deviate
from the best rigid price when prices are procyclical. However, a price
above the best rigid price is not supportable in low-cost states, because
the punishment for such a price is not credible. This is because for any
such price there are some punishment subgames where ﬁrms should
match a price above the best rigid price in all future periods, but eachﬁrm
has an incentive to deviate from it in such punishment subgames that
start with a period of low costs. Consequently, the best rigid price is the
highest price that is supportable in low-cost states when prices are rigid
or procyclical. However, it is more proﬁtable to set the monopoly price
when thebest rigid price is above it, so p*(0) is the lower of the best rigid
price and the monopoly price of the low-cost state for all c∈ 0; c^ð .
Finally, to ﬁnd whether procyclical prices are supportable, consider
ﬁrm i's incentive to deviate from p(c) above p*(0) in a period of high
costs, while holding the collusive price of low-cost states ﬁxed at p*(0).
Firm i's present discounted value of deviation proﬁts if it sets the same
or a lower price p∈ [p*(0), p(c)] in the initial period, then conforms to
(3) thereafter is:
ΩxiH p;p cð Þ; p 0ð Þ
	 

≡ πi p;p cð Þ; c; nð Þ þ
δ
1−δ
θ
ω
π p 0ð Þ;n	 
þ 1− θ
ω
 
π p; c; nð Þ
 
:
ð7Þ
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of Eq. (7) is the proﬁt from
the initial period. The second term represents the expected dis-
counted proﬁts from future periods, given pwill be matched in future
high-cost states but p*(0) is set in future low-cost states. It follows
from this that ﬁrm i will not deviate from p(c) by setting p if ΩH(p(c),
p*(0))≥ΩiHx (p, p(c), p*(0)) for all p∈ [p*(0), p(c)]. The slack in this
constraint is:
ξxiH p; p cð Þð Þ≡− πi p;p cð Þ; c;nð Þ−π p cð Þ; c;nð Þ½ 
þ δ
1−δ 1−
θ
ω
 
π p cð Þ; c;nð Þ−π p; c;nð Þ½ Þ;
which does not depend on p*(0) because the punishment results in
ﬁrms still setting p*(0) in low-cost states.
To see that the best collusive prices can be rigid under price-
matching punishments, suppose ﬁrm i deviates from p(c) to p=p*(0).
Given the punishment is limited to future high-cost states when such a
deviation is matched, there is no long-term loss for such a deviation
when all future periods are expected to have low costs (i.e. θ=1 and
λ=0). Thus, each ﬁrm will have an incentive to deviate from any p(c)
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c∈ 0; c^ð . Proposition 1 shows that the best collusive prices can still be
rigid when high costs persist into the future.
Proposition 1. For every n≥2, δ∈(0, 1) and 1−θ−λ≥0, there exists
a unique c∈ 0; c^ð Þ such that the best rigid price, pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ), is
the best collusive price in both cost states if and only if c∈(0, c*], where
pN(c, n)bpLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ)bpm.
When the difference between the two cost levels is below the
critical threshold, a ﬁrm will want to deviate from a price above yet
very close to the best rigid price in high-cost states. To see this point,
consider a deviation from such a p(c) to a price equal to or just above
p*(0) in a period of high costs.10 Notice that ξiHx (p, p(c)) is the same as
ξiLy(p, p(c)) as c→0, except that there is no long-term loss in proﬁts of
future low-cost states. This implies that since it is proﬁtable to deviate
from a rigid price above the best rigid price in a period of low costs,
then an otherwise identical deviation is even more proﬁtable in
a period of high costs as c→0 when prices are procyclical (i.e. for any
p(c)>pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ), ξiHx (p, p(c))bξiLy (p, p(c))b0 for some pbp(c) as
c→0). As the level of high costs increases towards c*, the proﬁtability
of such a deviation falls.11 However, a price above yet very close to
the best rigid price is not supportable until the level of high costs
exceeds c*.
Prices above yet very close to the best rigid price may not be
supportable in high-cost states, even though the best rigid price is
always supportable. This is because there is a discontinuity in the
incentives to collude at p*(0), which arises due to the fact that a
deviation from p(c) to a price equal to or just above p*(0) only lowers
prices in future high-cost states. Consequently, such a deviation from
a price above yet very close to the rigid price in a period of high costs
generates a much smaller long-term loss than an otherwise identical
deviation from the rigid price, where price matching reduces the
prices of all future periods. Yet, the deviation gains are effectively the
same for such deviations. As a result, for some positive values of c, it
can be the case that a deviation from a price above yet very close to
the best rigid price is strictly proﬁtable in a period of high costs, even
though a deviation from the best rigid price is strictly unproﬁtable.
When the difference between the two cost levels is so large that
the best collusive price of the low-cost state is pm, the best collusive
prices are procyclical. This is because pm is the best collusive price of
low-cost states, if the ﬁrst-order increase in the deviation proﬁt from
a small deviation from pm in a period of low costs is outweighed by
the ﬁrst-order decrease in proﬁts of future high-cost states (there is
no ﬁrst-order decrease in proﬁts of future low-cost states, since such
proﬁts are ﬂat at pm). In comparison to this, a small deviation from a
price above yet very close to pm in a period of high costs leads to a
smaller ﬁrst-order increase in the deviation proﬁts and a (weakly)
larger ﬁrst-order decrease in proﬁts of future high-cost states. This
implies that the best collusive prices will be procyclical, because a
ﬁrm will not deviate from a price above yet very close to pm in a
period of high costs, if a ﬁrm will not deviate from pm in a period of
low costs.4.2. Price rigidity and the expected duration of a high-cost phase
The best collusive prices are rigid when the difference between
the two costs levels is below the critical threshold. Proposition 2 now
shows that this critical threshold depends upon the extent to which a10 It is never proﬁtable to deviate from any procyclical p(c) by setting a price below
p*(0) in a period of high costs for all c∈ 0; c^ð .
11 This is because the deviation gain strictly decreases and long-term loss strictly
increases as the level of high costs rises, due to the fact that high-cost states are less
proﬁtable than before; and it is despite of the fact that the deviation occurs from a
slightly higher price, since the best rigid price strictly increases with the level of high
costs.high-cost state is likely to persist into the future. To see this point,
deﬁne a high-cost phase as a sequence of high-cost states that begins
in a period where costs change from the low- to the high-cost state
and ends the period before they change back. The expected duration
of a high-cost phase is Σt=1∞ tθ(1−θ)t−1=1/θ, which implies that the
lower the probability that costs will change from the high- to the low-
cost state in the following period, the longer a high-cost phase is likely
to last. Similarly, we can deﬁne a low-cost phase with an expected
duration of 1/λ.
Proposition 2. For every n≥2, δ∈(0, 1) and 1−θ−λ≥0, the critical
difference between the two cost levels, c*, is strictly decreasing in the
expected duration of a high-cost phase.
As the expected duration of a high-cost phase increases, other
things equal, it is easier to support a price above yet very close to the
best rigid price in high-cost states. This comes about from two
opposing effects. First, a direct effect reduces the proﬁtability of a
small deviation from such a price. Second, an indirect effect raises the
proﬁtability of such a deviation, because the deviation occurs from a
slightly higher price than before, since the best rigid price strictly
increases with the expected duration of a high-cost phase. Both
effects are caused by the fact that the punishment strategy leads to
larger long-term losses when future periods are likely to consist of
more high-cost states. The direct effect dominates the indirect effect,
which implies that, for a given difference between the two cost levels,
procyclical prices are easier to support as the expected duration of a
high-cost phase increases, so the critical threshold falls. When there is
zero correlation (so that the expected duration of a low-cost phase
decreases at the same rate as the expected duration of a high-cost
phase increases) both the direct and indirect effects are larger than
under positive correlation, but the direct effect still dominates.
We have already seen that the best collusive prices are rigid when a
high-cost phase is expected to last only one period and the following
low-cost phase lasts forever, provided the one-shot Nash equilibrium
price of the high-cost state is not above the best rigid price (i.e. c→c^ as
θ→1 and λ→0). On the other hand, when a high-cost phase is
expected to last forever, the best collusive prices are procyclical,
regardless of the expected duration of a low-cost phase (i.e. c*→0 as
θ→0 for all 0bλb1). This is because for such conditions it is more
proﬁtable to deviate from a rigid price in a period of low costs than to
deviate from a price above yet very close to the rigid price in a period of
high costs (i.e. as θ→0, ξiHx (p, pc)>ξiLy(p, pc) for all pbpc). Therefore,
provided a ﬁrmwill not deviate from the rigid price in low-cost states, it
will not deviate from a price above yet very close to the rigid price in
high-cost states.
4.3. Price rigidity and proﬁts over the ﬂuctuations
The preceding analysis showed that the best rigid price strictly
increases with the level of high costs. Proposition 3 shows that this
implies that there are also general properties for the resultant collusive
proﬁts when the best collusive prices are rigid.
Proposition 3. For any c∈(0,c*), per-period proﬁts when costs are high
(low) are strictly decreasing (increasing) in the level of high costs, c,
when ﬁrms set the best rigid price. The present discounted values of
collusive proﬁts are strictly decreasing in c when ﬁrms set the best rigid
price in both states, whether the initial period has high or low costs.
Clearly, per-period proﬁts are greater in a low-cost state than in a
high-cost state, when ﬁrms set the best rigid price in both states. As
the level of high costs rises towards c*, the difference in such proﬁts
becomes larger for two reasons. First, per-period proﬁts in low-cost
states are larger than before, since the best rigid price rises with the
level of high cost but it remains below pm. Second, per-period proﬁts in
high-cost states are smaller than before, because the best rigid price
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contrast, the present discounted values of collusive proﬁts are equal
when the high-cost level is equal to the low-cost level, but such proﬁts
fall as the high-cost level rises towards c*, regardless of whether the
initial period has low or high costs.
5. An example
We complement the above analysis by assuming that demand is
derived from the constant elasticity of substitution version of Spence–
Dixit–Stiglitz preferences (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; and Spence, 1976).
We do this for three reasons. First, we want to show that the best
collusive prices are rigid for reasonably large differences in the two cost
levels. Second,wewant to investigate the effect of the degree of product
differentiation on such price rigidity. To the author's knowledge, there
is no other model of collusive price rigidity that considers this, since
both Athey et al. (2004) and Hanazono and Yang (2007) analyse
homogeneous products. Third, we want to investigate the effect of the
number of ﬁrms in themarket on such price rigidity, and this ultimately
depends upon the degree of product differentiation. We use Spence–
Dixit–Stiglitz preferences, because it falls into the class of our general
model and it generates results with simpler intuition than alternatives,
since it isolates the competitive effects of product differentiation as
there is no market expansion effect.12
A representative consumer's utility function is U xð Þ ¼
n1−κ
1−κ
1
nΣx
1−ϕκ
i
  1−κ
1−ϕκ þm, where x is the vector of consumption of the n
products, m is expenditure on other goods, ϕ∈(0, 1) measures the
degree of product differentiation, where products are less differentiated
the closer ϕ is to zero, and κ∈(0, 1) is a parameter. It follows from this
utility function that the direct demand function for ﬁrm i is:
qi pi;p−i;ϕ;nð Þ ¼
1
n
p−
1
κ
i
n
Σj pi=pj
 1−ϕκ
ϕκ
2
64
3
75
1−ϕ
1−ϕκ
:
This implies that total demand at equal prices is independent of
both the degree of product differentiation and the number of ﬁrms,
i.e. q(p)=p−1/κ. It is straightforward to show that the monopoly
price is pm(ct)=ct/(1−κ) and that the one-shot Nash equilibrium
price is pN ct ;n;ϕð Þ ¼ ct= 1−κ= 1þ 1−ϕϕ n−1n
 h i
. To ensure that the
monopoly price is above the one-shot Nash equilibrium price for both
cost states, we assume that the level of low costs is Pc∈ 0; cð Þ and we
normalise the high-cost level relative to the low-cost level later.
For this example, the best rigid price is:
pyL c;n; δ;λ; θ;ϕð Þ ¼ P
c
1−κ= 1þ 1−δð Þ 1−ϕϕ n−1n
 
þ δλ c−Pc
	 

ω 1−κ þ 1−δð Þ 1−ϕϕ n−1n
  ; ð8Þ
which applies forPcbc≤c^.13 The ﬁrst term on the right hand-side of Eq.
(8) is equivalent to the best collusive price analysed in Lu and Wright
(2010) and the second term captures the effect of varying costs. This
price equals Pc when products are homogeneous, and it is everywhere
strictly increasing in the degree of product differentiation, ϕ. It is above
the one-shot Nash equilibrium price of the low-cost state for all 0bϕ≤1,
and it is above the monopoly price of the low-cost state when products12 Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz preferences is one example of differentiated demand
analysed by Kühn and Rimler (2007) for collusion models under Nash reversion and
optimal punishment strategies. It has not been analysed for collusion under price-
matching punishments before. Similar results as those presented here can be derived
using the standard Bertrand competition model with linear demands.
13 Following Lemma 1, c^ ¼ 1−κ= 1þ 1−ϕϕ n−1n
h i 
Pc
1−κ 1−δλωð Þ= 1−δð Þ 1þ1−ϕϕ n−1nð Þþδ 1−λωð Þ½ .are not substitutable. It is everywhere strictly decreasing in the number
of ﬁrms, n, but it is always above the one-shot Nash equilibrium price of
the low-cost state, even when there is a large number of ﬁrms in the
market. 14
The price in Eq. (8) deﬁnes the best collusive price in both cost states
when the difference between the two cost states is below the critical
threshold. It follows from Proposition 1 that c ¼ Pc1−K ∈ Pc ; c^
	 

where:
K ≡
κ δθω 1−δð Þ 1−ϕϕ n−1n
1−κð Þ 1− δθω
	 
þ 1−δð Þ 1−ϕϕ n−1n  1− δλω þ 1−δð Þ 1−ϕϕ n−1n  ∈ 0;1ð Þ:
To illustrate the properties of c*, Fig. 2 plots Δc≡ c
− c
P
c
P
¼ K1−K as a
function of ϕ for three levels of n. This has two interpretations. First, Δc*
is the critical proportional difference between the two cost states, where
the best collusive prices are rigid for any proportional difference that
does not exceed this level. Second, it measures proportional difference
between the monopoly price when the cost state is c* and the monop-
oly price of the low-cost state (i.e. pm cð Þ−pm Pc Þ
	 
=pm Pc Þ ¼
	
Δc).
Parameter values are chosen such that the monopoly price of the low-
cost state is equal to unity, future costs are independent of the current
level, and each cost state is equally likely in any future period.
The Figure shows that there is a non-monotonic relationship between
Δc* and the degree of product differentiation. For certain intermediate
degrees of differentiation, the best collusive prices are rigid when the
monopoly price of the high-cost state is 16% higher than the monopoly
price of the low-cost state, and such price rigidity can occur for even
larger differences between the two cost levels when the expected
durationof a high-cost phase is shorter.15 The best collusive prices are not
rigid when products are homogeneous or when each product has no
close substitutes. This is because the punishment strategy does not
support collusive prices when the products are homogeneous, since an
inﬁnitesimally small deviation from the collusive price captures the
wholemarket and the price-matching strategy leads to virtually no long-
term loss. Consequently, ﬁrms set the one-shot Nash equilibrium price in
each cost state. In contrast, ﬁrms can set the monopoly price in each cost
state when they are local monopolies, with no close substitutes.
Finally, Fig. 2 shows that Δc* is larger for concentrated markets, with
few ﬁrms, than for less concentrated markets, with a greater number of
ﬁrms, when the degree of product differentiation is sufﬁciently low; the
opposite relationship may exist otherwise. This is not inconsistent with
empirical research that shows that prices are less responsive to changes in
market conditions in some cases when the markets are more concen-
trated (see Bedrossian and Moschos, 1988; Carlton, 1986; Dixon, 1983;
Geroski, 1992;Weiss, 1995) but the opposite relationship exists in others
(see Domberger, 1979; Kardasz and Stollery, 1988). The reason behind
this result in our model is that it can either be more or less proﬁtable to
deviate from a price above yet very close to the best rigid price in a period
of high costs, as the number of ﬁrms increases. This is because there are
two opposing effects. First, a direct effect raises the proﬁtability of a small
deviation from such a price. Second, an indirect effect reduces the
proﬁtability of such a deviation, because the deviation occurs from a
slightly lower price than before, since the best rigid price strictly
decreases with the number of ﬁrms in the market. Both effects are
caused by the fact that the deviation gains are larger and the punishment
strategy leads to smaller long-term losses when there are a greater
number of ﬁrms in the market (from Assumption 4 and symmetric
demand, respectively). In our general framework, it is not possible to sign
the overall effect. In our example, however, the indirect effect dominates
the direct effect when the degree of product differentiation is sufﬁciently14 This is because the underlying competition game is one of true monopolistic
competition, where the price is above marginal cost even as n→∞.
15 For example, if λ=0.01 and θ=0.99, the shape of Δc* is similar to that of Fig. 2,
except that the best collusive prices can be rigid when the monopoly price of the high-
cost state is 40% higher than the monopoly price of the low-cost state.
Fig. 2. (Pc=0.5, λ=1−θ=0.5, κ=0.5, δ=0.9).
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procyclical prices are easier to support as the number of ﬁrms in the
market increases, so the critical threshold falls.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we analysed an inﬁnitely repeated game where unit
costs alternate stochastically between low and high states and where
ﬁrms employ a price-matching punishment strategy. This provided
game theoretic support for the results of the kinked demand curve,
because we showed that the best collusive prices can be rigid over time
when the difference between the two costs levels is below some critical
threshold. Moreover, we showed that this critical threshold is closer to
zero as high-cost states are likely to persist for longer into the future, and
it equals zero when the high-cost state is expected to last permanently.
When the best collusive prices are rigid over time, the best rigid price is
always between the one-shot Nash equilibrium price of the high-cost
state and themonopoly price of the low-cost state, and it monotonically
increases with the level of high costs at a rate that is less than one-to-
one. As a result, an increase in the level of high costs raises the resultant
per-period proﬁts of a low-cost state, but it reduces such per-period
proﬁts of a high-cost state. Nevertheless, the corresponding present
discounted values of collusive proﬁts are decreasing in the level of high
costs, whether the initial period has high or low costs. Finally, when
demand is derived from the constant elasticity of substitution version of
Spence–Dixit–Stiglitz preferences, we found that the best collusive
prices are rigid for the largest difference between the two cost levels
when products are differentiated by an intermediate degree; and that
the best collusive prices are rigid for a larger difference between the two
cost levels in a concentrated market than in a less concentrated market,
when the degree of product differentiation is sufﬁciently low.
Throughout the paper, we have considered only two cost states,
but periods of price rigidity are not restricted to this special case. For
example, when a medium-cost state is added and there is zero
correlation, the best rigid price is unaffected by the introduction of
the third state, if the expected level of future costs is unchanged
compared to the two-state model. Moreover, holding the expected
level of future costs constant also ensures that future high-cost states
are less likely in this three-state model than the two-state model. As a
result, there is a greater incentive to deviate from a procyclical price
in a period of high costs in this three-state model than the two-state
model, when such a deviation only leads to a long-term loss in proﬁts
of future high-cost states. Thus, when the difference between the
low- and the high-cost states is such that the best collusive prices are
rigid in the two-state model, the best collusive prices in this three-state
modelwill either be rigid for every cost state or partially rigid (where thebest collusive prices are rigid in medium- and high-cost states, at a price
above the best collusive price of low-cost states). Applying this logic to
more than three cost states suggests that it is even more difﬁcult to
support procyclical prices in the highest-cost state than in the two-state
model, so periods of price rigidity can occur for any number of states.
Finally, an important avenue for future research is to investigate
whether there exists any circumstances where ﬁrms will choose to
support collusive prices through a weaker punishment, such as price
matching, rather than harsher punishment strategies, such as Nash
reversion or optimal punishment strategies. Such a theoretical
justiﬁcation for price matching may provide a better indication of
the industry characteristics where price rigidity is likely to prevail.
It would also resolve the tension between the informal reasoning
behind the belief that ﬁrms will employ the harshest credible
punishment with the evidence that, at least in some situations,
tacitly colluding ﬁrms (and even some cartels) do not employ such
punishments.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the collusive price is pN(c, n) in both cost
states. To prove subgame perfection, it sufﬁces to check that there is
no history that leads to a subgame in which a one-stage deviation
is proﬁtable. For every history, the lowest ever deviation price below
pN(c, n) at some period τ ismin pdτ ; p
N c;nð Þ . Ifmin pdτ  ≤ pN nð Þ, then
(3) trivially deﬁnes a Nash equilibrium in the subsequent punishment
subgames, whether they start with a period of high or low costs.
Otherwise, the subsequent punishment subgames are identical to a
history in which ﬁrms had set pN(c, n) in high-cost states and
min pdτ ;p
N c;nð Þ ∈ pN nð Þ;pN c;nð Þ	  in low-cost states. Clearly, (3)
deﬁnes a Nash equilibrium in the subgames that start with a period
of high costs. Thus, we must ﬁnd the conditions for which a ﬁrm will
not deviate from pN(c, n) or from any price between pN(n) and pN(c,
n) in subgames that start with a period of low costs.
Suppose we consider some collusive price p∈(pN(n), pN(c,n)] that
is set in low-cost states, where pN(c, n) is set in high-cost states.
Consider ﬁrm i setting the same or a lower price pi∈ [pN(n), p] in a
period of low costs. From (4) deﬁne:
ΔΩzL pð Þ≡
∂πi pi;p;nð Þ
∂pi
þ δ
1−δ 1−
λ
ω
 
dπ pi;nð Þ
dpi
 
pi¼p
:
Firm i will not deviate from p if ΔΩLz(p)≥0, otherwise ΩL(p, pN(c,
n))bΩiLz (pi, p, pN(c, n)) for some pibp. We wish to show that if ΔΩLz(pN(c,
n))≥0, then ΔΩLz(p)≥0∀p∈(pN(n), pN(c, n)). Differentiating ΔΩLz(p)
with respect to p yields:
dΔΩzL pð ÞÞ
dp
¼ ∂
2πi pi; p;nð Þ
∂p2i
þ∑j≠i
∂2πi pi; p;nð Þ
∂pi∂pj
þ δ
1−δ 1−
λ
ω
 
d2π pi;nð Þ
dp2i
" #
pi¼pj¼p
:
It follows from Eq. (2) and Assumption 5 that
d ΔΩzL pð Þð Þ
dp b 0. Hence, if
ΔΩLz(pN(c, n))≥0, then ΔΩLz(p)>0∀p∈(pN(n), pN(c, n)). Thus, a ﬁrm
will not deviate from a price between pN(n) and pN(c, n), if it will not
deviate from pN(c, n).
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 ¼ 0 because
ΔΩzL p
N nð Þ	 
 > 0;ΔΩzL pN c;nð Þ	 
 ¼ ΔΩzL pmð Þb0 and:
d ΔΩzL p
N
  
dc
¼ d ΔΩ
z
L pð Þ
	 

dp
dpN
dc
" #
p¼pN c;nð Þ
b0;
since
d ΔΩzL pð Þð Þ
dp b0 and
dpN
dc > 0. Thus, ΔΩL
z(pN(c,n))≥0 if and only if
c∈ 0; c^ð . The above analysis implies that pN(c,n) and p, such that
pN(n)bp≤pN(c,n), are supportable in high- and low-cost states,
respectively, if and only if c∈ 0; c^ð . □
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose the collusive price is pc in both cost
states. To prove subgame perfection, it sufﬁces to check that there is
no history that leads to a subgame in which a one-stage deviation is
proﬁtable. For every history, the lowest ever deviation price below pc
at some period τ is min pdτ ; p
c
 
. If min pdτ ; p
c
 
≤pN c;nð Þ, then Eq. (3)
deﬁnes a Nash equilibrium in the subsequent punishment subgames,
whether they startwith a period of high or low costs, if and only ifc∈ 0; c^ð 
(from Lemma 1). Otherwise, the subsequent punishment subgames are
identical to a history in which ﬁrms had set min pdτ ; p
c
 
∈ pN c;nð Þ;pc	 
in both high- and low-cost states. Thus, we must ﬁnd the conditions
for which a ﬁrmwill not deviate from pc or from any rigid price between
pN(c, n) and pc in subgames that start with a period of high or low costs.
Suppose we consider some collusive price p∈(pN(c, n), pc] that is set
in both cost states, where c∈ 0; c^ð . First, consider ﬁrm i setting a lower
price pi∈[pN(n), pN(c,n)] in a period of low costs, so its present
discounted value of deviation proﬁts are given by (4). It is more
proﬁtable to deviate from p to pN(c, n) than to any price below pN(c, n),
because ΔΩzL p
N c;nð Þ	 
≥0 ∀ c∈ 0; c^ð  and prices are strategic comple-
ments. Thus,wemust consider deviationswhere ﬁrm i sets the same or a
lower price pi∈[pN(c, n), p]. From Eqs. (5) and (6), respectively, deﬁne:
ΔΩyH pð Þ≡
∂πi pi;p; c;nð Þ
∂pi
þ δ
1−δ
θ
ω
dπ pi;nð Þ
dpi
þ 1− θ
ω
 
dπ pi; c; nð Þ
dpi
  
pi¼p
ΔΩyL pð Þ≡
∂πi pi;p;nð Þ
∂pi
þ δ
1−δ
λ
ω
dπ pi; c;nð Þ
dpi
þ 1− λ
ω
 
dπ pi;nð Þ
dpi
  
pi¼p
:
Firm iwill not deviate from p in a period of low costs if ΔΩLy(p)≥0,
otherwise ξiLy (pi,p)b0 for some pibp. We wish to show that if
ΔΩLy(pc)≥0, then ΔΩLy(p)≥0 and ΔΩHy(p)≥0∀p∈ (pN(c, n), pc].
First, differentiating ΔΩLy(p) with respect to p yields:
d ΔΩyL pð Þ
	 

dp
¼
"
∂2πi pi; p;nð Þ
∂p2i
þ∑j≠i
∂2πi pi; p;nð Þ
∂pi∂pj
þ δ
1−δ
λ
ω
d2π pi; c;nð Þ
dp2i
þ 1− λ
ω
 
d2π pi;nð Þ
dp2i
 !#
pi¼pj¼p:
It follows from Eq. (2) and Assumption 5 that
d ΔΩyL pð Þð Þ
dp b 0. Hence, if
ΔΩLy(pc)≥0 , then ΔΩLy(p)>0∀p∈(pN(c, n), pc). Thus, if ﬁrm iwill not
deviate from pc in a period of low costs, then it will not deviate from a
lower rigid price between pN(c, n) and pc. Next, consider:
ΔΩyH pð Þ−ΔΩyL pð Þ ¼− c
∂qi pi;p;nð Þ
∂pi
þ δ
ω
1−θ−λð Þ c
n
dq pið Þ
dpi
 
pi¼p
:
Assumption 1 and 1−θ−λ≥0 imply that the above is positive.
So, if ΔΩLy(pc)≥0, then ΔΩHy(p)>ΔΩLy(p)≥0∀p∈(pN(c, n), pc]. Thus,
ﬁrm i will also not deviate from pc or any rigid price between pN(c, n)
and pc in a period of high costs.
Given
d ΔΩyL pð Þð Þ
dp b 0, there exists a unique best rigid price, pL
y(c,n, δ,λ, θ),
which is the level of p that solves ΔΩLy(p)=0. It satisﬁes pN(c, n)bpLy(c, n,
δ, λ, θ)bpm(c) since ΔΩyL p
N c;nð Þ	 
 > ΔΩzL pN c;nð Þ	 
≥ 0 ∀ c∈ 0; c^ð  and
ΔΩLy(pm(c))b0. The above analysis implies that any rigid price pc suchthat pN(c, n)bpc≤pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ) is supportable if and only if c∈ 0; c^ð .
□
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose the collusive prices are p(0) and
p(c)>p(0) in low- and high-cost states, respectively, where without
loss of generality let p(0)>pN(c, n). To prove subgame perfection,
it sufﬁces to check that there is no history that leads to a subgame
in which a one-stage deviation is proﬁtable. For every history,
the lowest ever deviation price below p(cτ) at some period τ is
min pdτ ;p cτð Þ
 
. If min pdτ
 
≤ pN c;nð Þ b p 0ð Þ, then Eq. (3) deﬁnes a
Nash equilibrium in the subsequent punishment subgames, whether
they start with a period of high or low costs, if and only if c∈ 0; c^ð 
(from Lemma 1). If pN c;nð Þ bmin pdτ
 
≤ p 0ð Þ, then Eq. (3) deﬁnes a
Nash equilibrium in the subsequent punishment subgames, whether
they start with a period of high or low costs, if and only if p(0)≤pLy(c,
n, δ, λ, θ) (from Lemma 2). Otherwise, the subsequent punishment
subgames are identical to a history in which ﬁrms had set
min pdτ ;p cð Þ
 
∈ p 0ð Þ; p cð Þð  in high-cost states and p(0) in low-cost
states. Thus, to ﬁnd when procyclical prices are supportable, we
must ﬁnd the conditions for which a ﬁrm will not deviate from p(c)
or from any price between p(0) and p(c) in subgames that start with
a period of high costs. Moreover, we have to check that a ﬁrm will
not deviate from p(0)≤pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ) when p(c)>p(0) in subgames
that start with a period of low costs.
Suppose we consider some collusive prices such that p(0)>pN(c,
n) is set in low-cost states and p∈(p(0), p(c)] is set in high-cost
states, where c∈ 0; c^ð . Furthermore, recall that there are punishment
subgames in which a ﬁrm will not conform to (3) for any p(0) above
pL
y(c, n, δ, λ, θ), so it must be the case that p(0)≤pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ).
Consider ﬁrm i deviating from such a p(0) in a period of low costs. It is
not proﬁtable to set a higher price, because this decreases proﬁts in
the initial period and it decreases proﬁts of future high-cost states.
Moreover, it is not proﬁtable to deviate to pi∈ [pN(c, n), p(0)], because
given ΩL(p(0),p(0))≥ΩiLy (pi,p(0))∀pi∈ [pN(c,n),p(0)] if p(0)≤pLy(c, n,
δ, λ, θ) (from Lemma 2), thenΩL(p(0), p)>ΩiLy(pi, p(0)) for any such pi.
Finally, it is not proﬁtable to set pi∈ [pN(n), pN(c, n)) because it is more
proﬁtable to deviate from p(0) to pN(c, n) than to any price below pN(c,
n), since ΔΩzL p
N c;nð Þ	 
≥ 0 ∀ c∈ 0; c^ð  and prices are strategic comple-
ments. This implies that a ﬁrmwill not deviate from any p(0), such that
pN(c, n)bp(0)≤pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ), when p>p(0). Thus, the best collusive
price of the low-cost state is p 0ð Þ ¼min pyL c;n; δ;λ; θð Þ; pm
 
∀c∈ 0; c^ð .
Now suppose the collusive prices are p∈(p*(0), p(c)] in high-cost
states and p*(0) in low-cost states, where c∈ 0; c^ð . First, consider ﬁrm
i setting a lower price pi∈ [pN(c, n), p*(0)], so its present discounted
value of deviation proﬁts are given by (5). It is more proﬁtable to
deviate from p to p*(0) than to a price below p*(0) in a period of high
costs, because ΔΩyH p
 0ð Þð Þ > ΔΩyL p 0ð Þð Þ≥ 0 ∀ c∈ 0; c^ð  and prices
are strategic complements. Thus, we must consider deviations
where ﬁrm i sets the same or a lower price pi∈ [p*(0), p]. From (7),
deﬁne:
ΔΩxH pð Þ≡
∂πi pi;p; c;nð Þ
∂pi
þ δ
1−δ 1−
θ
ω
 
dπ pi; c;nð Þ
dpi
 
pi¼p
:
Firm iwill not deviate from p ifΔΩHx(p)≥0, otherwise ξiHx (pi, p)b0 for
some pibp. We wish to show that if ΔΩHx(p(c))≥0, then ΔΩHx(p)≥
0∀p∈(p*(0), p(c)). Differentiating ΔΩHx(p) with respect to p yields:
d ΔΩxH pð Þ
	 

dp
¼ ∂
2πi pi;p; c;nð Þ
∂p2i
þ∑j≠ i
∂2πi pi;p; c;nð Þ
∂pi∂pj
þ δ
1−δ 1−
θ
ω
 
d2π pi; c;nð Þ
dp2i
" #
pi¼pj¼p
:
It follows from Eq. (2) and Assumption 5 that
d ΔΩxH pð Þð Þ
dp b 0. Hence,
if ΔΩHx(p(c))≥0, then ΔΩHx(p)>0∀p∈(p*(0), p(c)). Thus, a ﬁrm will
not deviate from a price between p*(0) and p(c) , if it will not deviate
from p(c). This implies that the best collusive prices are procyclical
when ΔΩHx(p*(0))>0, otherwise they are rigid over time at p*(0).
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from a price above yet very close to pm in a period of high costs when
p*(0)=pm. Thus, the best collusive prices can only be rigid at pLy(c, n,
δ, λ, θ)bpm, and this occurs if and only if ΔΩHx(pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ))≤0.
Finally, we must show that there exists a unique c∈ 0; c^ð Þ such that
ΔΩHx(pLy(c*, n, δ, λ, θ))=0, where ΔΩHx(pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ))≤0∀c∈(0, c*].
First notice that c*>0, because limc→0ΔΩHx(pc)b limc→0ΔΩLy(pc)
∀pc∈[pN(c, n), pm], so limc→0ΔΩHx(pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ))b0 since limc→0ΔΩ-
L
y(pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ))=0. Next, consider:
d ΔΩxH p
y
L
	 
	 

dc
¼− ∂qi pi; p;nð Þ∂pi
þ δ
1−δð Þ
1
n
1− θ
ω
 
dq pið Þ
dpi
− d ΔΩ
x
H pð Þ
	 

dp
dpyL
dc
" #
pi¼p¼pyL c;n;δ;λ;θð Þ
¼− ∂qi pi;p;nð Þ∂pi
þ δ
1−δð Þ
1
n
1− θ
ω
−α λ
ω
 
dq pið Þ
dpi
 
pi¼p¼pyL c;n;δ;λ;θð Þ
where α≡ d ΔΩ
x
H pð Þð Þ=dp
d ΔΩyL pð Þð Þ=dp > 0 and:
dpyL
dc
¼ 1
d ΔΩyL pð Þð Þ
dp
δ
1−δð Þ
1
n
λ
ω
dq pið Þ
dpi
pi¼p¼pyL c;n;δ;λ;θð Þ > 0:

If 1− θω −α λω
 
> 0, then
d ΔΩxH p
y
Lð Þð Þ
dc > 0, where α≤1 is sufﬁcient for this
to be true. Subtracting
d ΔΩyL pð Þð Þ
dp from
d ΔΩxH pð Þð Þ
dp yields:
−
"
c
∂2qi pi;p;nð Þ
∂p2i
þ∑j≠i
∂2qi pi; p;nð Þ
∂pi∂pj
 !
þ δ
1−δ 1−
λ
ω
 
d2π pi;nð Þ
dp2i
þ δ
ω
1−θ−λð Þd
2π pi; c;nð Þ
dp2i
#
pi¼pj¼p
ð9Þ
which is positive from Assumptions 3 and 5, and 1−θ−λ≥0, so αb1.
Hence,
d ΔΩxH p
y
Lð Þð Þ
dc > 0, which implies that c* is unique and thatΔΩH
x(pLy(c,
n, δ, λ, θ))b0∀c∈(0, c*). Finally, to see that c b c^, consider:
ΔΩxH pð Þ−ΔΩyL pð Þ ¼
∂πi pi;p; c;nð Þ
∂pi
þ δ
ω
1−θ−λð Þdπ pi; c; nð Þ
dpi
−ΔΩzL pð Þ
 
pi¼p
:
ð10Þ
When evaluated at pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ), (10) is non-positive for all
c∈(0, c*]. Differentiating (10) with respect to p yields (9), which is
positive. This implies that Eq. (10) is negative for all p∈[pN(c, n), pLy(c, n,
δ, λ, θ)). Thus, for Eq. (10) to be negative when evaluated at pN(c, n), it
follows thatΔΩLz(pN(c, n))>0 since the ﬁrst termon the right-hand side
of (10) is zero at pN(c, n) and the second is non-negative at pN(c, n)∀1
−θ−λ≥0. GivenΔΩzL pN c^;nð Þ
	 
 ¼ 0, then cbc^ since d ΔΩzL pNð Þð Þdc b 0 (see
the Proof of Lemma 1). □
Proof of Proposition 2. Totally differentiating ΔΩHx(pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ))=0
yields:
dc
dλ
¼− 1
d ΔΩxH p
y
L
	 
	 

dc
d ΔΩxH p
y
L
	 
	 

dλ
dc
dθ
¼− 1
d ΔΩxH p
y
L
	 
	 

dc
d ΔΩxH p
y
L
	 
	 

dθ
where
d ΔΩxH p
y
Lð Þð Þ
dc > 0 (from the Proof of Proposition 1).
The total derivative of ΔΩHx(pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ)) with respect to λ∀1−
θ−λ=0 is:
d ΔΩxH p
y
L
	 
	 

dλ
¼ δ
1−δ
dπ pi; c;nð Þ
dpi
þ d ΔΩ
x
H pð Þ
	 

dp
dpyL
dλ
" #
pi¼p¼pyL c;n;δ;λ;θð Þ
¼ δ
1−δ
dπ pi;nð Þ
dpi
− 1−αð Þ c
n
dq pið Þ
dpi
 
pi¼p¼pyL c;n;δ;λ;θð Þwhere α ≡ d ΔΩ
x
H pð Þð Þ=dp
d ΔΩyL pð Þð Þ=dp∈ 0;1ð Þ (from the Proof of Proposition 1) and:
dpyL
dλ
¼ 1
d ΔΩyL pð Þ
	 

dp
δ
1−δð Þ
c
n
dq pið Þ
dpi
pi¼p¼pyL c;n;δ;λ;θð Þ > 0:

The total derivative of ΔΩHx(pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ)) with respect to θ∀1−
θ−λ>0 is:
d ΔΩxH p
y
L
	 
	 

dθ
¼− δ 1−δ 1−λð Þð Þ
1−δð Þω2
dπ pi; c;nð Þ
dpi
−d ΔΩ
x
H pð Þ
	 

dp
dpyL
dθ
" #
pi¼p¼pyL c;n;δ;λ;θð Þ
¼− δ
1−δð Þω2 1−δ 1−λ 1−αð Þ½ ð Þ
dπ pi; c;nð Þ
dpi
þ αδλ dπ pi;nð Þ
dpi
 
pi¼p¼pyL c;n;δ;λ;θð Þ
where:
dpyL
dθ
¼− 1
d ΔΩyL pð Þð Þ
dp
δ2λ
1−δð Þω2
c
n
dq pið Þ
dpi
pi¼p¼pyL c;n;δ;λ;θð Þ b 0:

It follows from Assumptions 1 and 5, and 0bαb1 that
d ΔΩxH p
y
Lð Þð Þ
dλ > 0
and
d ΔΩxH p
y
Lð Þð Þ
dθ b 0, so
dc
dλ b 0 ∀ 1−θ−λ ¼ 0 and dc

dθ > 0 ∀ 1−θ−λ > 0.□
Proof of Proposition 3. It follows from Eq. (2) and Assumptions 1
and 5 that dp
y
L
dc ∈ 0; λω
	 

(see the Proof of Proposition 1). This guarantees
that per-period proﬁts are strictly increasing in c in low-cost states
but they are strictly decreasing in c in high-cost states, when such
proﬁts are evaluated at pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ).
Next, evaluate p(0) and p(c) in ΩL(p(0), p(c)) at pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ) and
totally differentiate with respect to c. This yields:
dΩL p
y
L ; p
y
L
	 

dc
¼− δ
1−δ
λ
ω
q pð Þ
n
−∑j≠i
∂πi p; p;nð Þ
∂pj
dpyL
dc
" #
pj¼p¼pyL c;n;δ;λ;θð Þ
¼− δ
1−δ
λ
ω
q pð Þ
n
þ p−cð Þ
n
dq pð Þ
dp
1
−d ΔΩ
y
L pð Þ
	 

dp
Σj≠i
∂qi p; p;nð Þ
∂pj
2
6664
3
7775
pj¼p¼pyL c;n;δ;λ;θð Þ
The above is negative since dπ p;c;nð Þdp ¼ q pð Þn þ p−cð Þn dq pð Þdp > 0 when p is
evaluated at pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ)∈(pN(c, n), pm), and
d ΔΩyL pð Þð Þ
dp

 > dq pð Þdp
  >
Σj≠i
∂qi p;p;nð Þ
∂pj
. This implies that each ﬁrm's present discounted value of
collusive proﬁts is strictly decreasing in c in low-cost states.
Finally, evaluate p(c) and p(0) in ΩH(p(c), p(0)) at pLy(c, n, δ, λ, θ)
and totally differentiate with respect to c. This yields:
dΩH p
y
L ;p
y
L
	 

dc
¼ − 1þ δ
1−δ 1−
θ
ω
  
q pð Þ
n
þ dΩH pð Þ
dp
dpyL
dc
 
p¼pyL c;n;δ;λ;θð Þ
¼−
"
q pð Þ
n
1−dp
y
L
dc
 
þ q pð Þ
n
δ
1−δ 1−
θ
ω
−dp
y
L
dc
 
−1
n
dq pð Þ
dp
dpyL
dc
p−cð Þ þ δ
1−δ p− 1−
θ
ω
 
c
  #
p¼pyL c;n;δ;λ;θð Þ
:
It follows from Assumption 1 and 0 b dp
y
L
dc b
λ
ω ≤ 1− θω
	 

b 1 ∀ 1−
θ−λ≥ 0 that the above is negative. This implies that each ﬁrm's present
discounted value of collusive proﬁts is strictly decreasing in c in high-cost
states. □
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